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The Author as Agent of Information Policy:  the Relationship between Economic 
and Moral Rights in Copyright 
 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson and Natasha Gerolami1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A historical and theoretical analysis of the copyright environment demonstrates that both 
the economic rights associated with copyright and the moral rights often associated with 
copyright perform social functions.  The latter have not been as universally embraced or 
adopted as the former.  The lack of enthusiasm for moral rights is argued to be because 
the social utility of this aspect of the copyright regime has gone largely unrecognised.  In 
fact, moral rights ensure that the information needs of the public are being met because 
they enhance the ability to assess the authority and reliability of information.  While 
historically this has not been as important as enhancing the supply of information, a 
function performed by the economic rights of copyright, in the context of the new 
information environment, the role played by moral rights is becoming increasingly 
important.  Our thesis also defines the appropriate scope of moral rights protection in 
copyright. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The use of the identity of the author as an organizing principle, as an indicator of 
the subject matter and quality of a work, is very much taken for granted by librarians and 
library patrons.  The author’s name is generally used to organize books on a shelf, to 
organize a bibliography and, frequently, to gather together titles in a library catalogue.2 In 
addition, the identity of the author not only aids in classifying works, it operates as an 
indicator of the subject and quality of the work. The relationship of the author to the text 
                                                 
1 Margaret Ann Wilkinson is Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Ontario and a 
graduate supervisor in both Law and Library and Information Science. This work was funded under an 
Initiatives in the New Economy grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. Natasha Gerolami is a doctoral student in Library and Information Science at the University of 
Western Ontario. Research assistance has been provided by law students Anna Milot and Vanessa Bacher. 
2 The primacy of the author as an access point is reflected in the fact that author is used as the “main entry” 
according to the Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules.  Of course, the use of main entry may be less 
important now that catalogues are online and hyper-links are used to connect files (see Bowman, 2003, p. 
7). Nevertheless, the author’s name still functions as a tool to bring all titles by one person together.  
Authority control, which ensures that one authorised form of an author’s name is used consistently, is still 
necessary to organise this collocation of works according to author in order to access material. 
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is drawn upon frequently when evaluation of a work is being conducted.  Collections 
librarians use the authority of the author as one of the guiding principles when making 
acquisition decisions or evaluating reference tools (Katz, 1997, p. 26).  Consideration is 
given to the reputation, experience and credentials of the author.  These characteristics of 
the author are assumed to have a direct bearing on the quality of the work. 
   The identity of the author, therefore, has always played a dual role in library and 
information science.  The author is used to aid access and bibliographic control by 
operating as one of the access points and organizing principles in catalogues, indexes, 
bibliographies and other reference tools.  At the same time, the identity of the author 
operates as an indicator of the quality and reliability of a text.   
Laura Gasaway notes the centrality of the author in both copyright law and in the 
library (Gasaway, 2003).  Societal recognition and respect for the author’s work, she 
argues, can justify and explain copyright.  It can also explain librarians’ use of the 
author’s identity as an organizing principle and mechanism for quality control.3   
Despite Gasaway’s observation, the economic rights of copyright,4 though 
identified with an author, do not, in and of themselves, protect the relationship between 
the author and the text.  The economic rights grant the copyright holders exclusive rights 
to make various uses of a work including copying, publishing, performing, translating 
and adapting the work.  The economic rights are granted to the author upon creation of 
the work and last for the life of the author plus 70 years (in the United States and also 
                                                 
3 It will be argued here that the elements of recognition and respect that Professor Gasaway argues justify 
the economic rights in copyright better justify moral rights in copyright – precisely for the same reasons 
that they function as a mechanism for quality control in library and information science. 
4 The term “economic rights” will be used throughout to distinguish the original concept of copyright from 
the later concept of moral rights. 
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generally in Europe) or life of the author plus 50 years (in Canada)5.  These rights are 
transferable and, therefore, the author, at any given time, is not necessarily the rights 
holder.6 There is another set of rights in copyright, granted in some jurisdictions, which 
are retained by the author even when the economic rights have been transferred to others:  
the moral rights.7  The two most basic moral rights are the right of paternity, which 
permits authors to object if their names are not used in association with the work, and the 
right of integrity, which permits authors to object to any modification, mutilation or 
distortion of their work that prejudices their honour.  Moral rights, at a minimum, thus 
allow an author to insist that his or her name will be attached to the work and that the 
work will not be altered in any way that affects the reputation of the author.   
In a time in which technology permits the easy transfer and modification of 
works, moral rights will become increasingly important.  Gasaway argues convincingly 
that changes in technology are making it more and more difficult for users and 
intermediaries, such as librarians, to assess the authority and reliability of works available 
in digital format (2003, pp. 1222-1223). The fact that texts appear and disappear with 
regular frequency, the difficulty in assessing the origin, author or publisher of the work, 
and the continual modification of on-line texts by various individuals create extreme 
difficulties in the authentication and preservation of works.  For this reason, legal 
provisions for moral rights provisions may be more important than ever in preserving the 
relationship between author and text.  Moral rights protection, frequently seen as personal 
                                                 
5 This is the minimum required protection according to the Berne Convention. 
6 Indeed, copyright statutes can vest initial ownership of a copyright interest in someone other than the 
author.  Under the Canadian statute, in an employment situation, the initial ownership of the economic 
rights in copyright vests with the employer even though the employee may be the author of the work (see 
Copyright Act, s.13.(3)). 
7 In the original French, the term does not carry the connotation of “ethical” that “moral” does in English:  
it simply connotes a relationship to an individual personality. 
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rights for authors to protect their reputations, should be recognised as playing an 
increasingly important public function.  As concern over efficient access to quality 
information grows, there should be greater recognition that, though distinct from the 
economic rights in copyright, legal protection for the moral rights of authors can play just 
as important a role in providing a balance between private rights and the public’s interest 
in information flow as has been traditionally attributed to the economic rights regime in 
copyright.                  
The stated purpose of copyright has long been taken to be to encourage the 
production and dissemination of works thereby increasing access to information.  The 
following historical overview of the development of the economic rights in copyright and 
of the moral rights will demonstrate that the two systems of rights function in 
complimentary, though distinct, manners.  In both cases, private rights to control and 
benefit from works are ultimately enshrined by law, to the benefit of the public.  We will 
demonstrate that traditionally the economic rights regime has been conceived of as a 
balance between owners’ rights to benefit financially from the exploitation of the works 
and users’ rights to benefit from access to the works.  The economic rights in copyright 
are fashioned as an incentive for authors to create and disseminate their works (Vaver, 
1991, p. 127).8    The intention of the legislation that created them is to balance owner 
and user rights and promote access to information, free speech, and education; ensuring 
that users are not unduly estopped from access to works.  We will argue that the moral 
rights in copyright also help to ensure that the information needs of the public are being 
                                                 
8 In the economic copyright regime, further interests of the public are recognized through certain exceptions 
to the interests of the economic rights holders: user’s rights provision.  In Canada, for example, certain 
exceptions, including the fair dealing provisions, are provided in the Copyright Act which permit users to 
copy and use works without violating the economic rights holders’ rights.  In the United States similar 
exceptions exist as fair use. 
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met.  The difference is only that the expanding role moral rights can play in the new 
information environment has largely gone unrecognised and has not been clearly 
articulated.  Indeed, this lack of recognition and articulation is so extensive that Patrick 
Masiyakurima concludes “[t]he trouble with moral rights is that no single theory can 
explain the purposes of moral rights protection convincingly” (2005, p.432).9   However, 
we will establish that there is a single explanation that justifies and encourages the 
provision of moral rights protection in law.  That explanation is the need for indicators of 
authority in information sources. We argue that it is necessary to identify and discuss this 
public utility of the moral rights regime, as an information policy issue, in order to 
establish the appropriate scope and limits of these rights.                 
 
2. The Characteristics, role and history of the economic rights in copyright 
(a)  Enhancing the supply of information 
 
                                                 
9 The concept of authority developed here is quite different from Masiyajurima’s “authenticity,” one of his 
four possible explanations for moral rights. Even he says his concept is very similar to another of his four, 
“the cultural heritage argument.”  He describes his notion of authenticity as “a hybrid interest designed to 
preserve the economic benefits of copyright transfers, the rights of consumers and the public interest in 
maintaining accurate artistic records”  ( p.428).  The concept of authority being described here is one which 
functions as a necessary attribute of every kind of information and which contributes to the ability of those 
seeking information to discriminate between available sources, each of which appears to provide 
information in satisfaction of a particular need but yet differs from other available sources.  Accuracy and 
reliability under our conception of authority, derived from library and information science, may be 
maintained by keeping the record unaltered but may also be preserved where a record is altered in a way 
sanctioned by the author:  a key component of the authority is the authority of the author, not necessarily 
the authority of a particular document, except as connected with the author’s control over it. The other two 
explanations that Masiyakurima canvasses are personality, also discussed herein, and freedom of 
expression.  His connection with freedom of expression is that exercise of moral rights permits authors to 
be recognized as participating in discourse and prohibits others from falsely claiming ideas (paternity) and 
also permits authors to control distortion of their ideas (integrity). However, we must point out that since 
moral rights attach to expressions, not ideas or facts, just as the economic rights in copyright do, it cannot 
be claimed that freedom of expression values are uniquely or even best served within the copyright 
framework by the moral rights provisions. It is the separation of both economic and moral rights (by 
attaching them both only to expressions) from the underlying facts and ideas that really guarantees freedom 
of expression.  
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In order to fully comprehend how moral rights provisions fit theoretically within 
the larger scope of the copyright regime and the broader policy frameworks surrounding 
information, we must first understand the role of economic rights in copyright.  The task 
is rendered more difficult by the fact that legal scholars continue to debate the theoretical 
foundations and function of economic rights in copyright.  Certain writers believe that 
copyright is granted to authors as a reward for their labour (Moore, 1997, and 
Drassinower, 2003). Other theorists have argued that copyright is granted to authors 
because of the romantic conception we have of authorship.  This conception of the author 
came to prominence during the Romantic movement of the eighteenth century.  It 
emphasises the intimate relationship between the author and the work (Aide, 1990, p. 
212).  The expression in an artistic or literary work was deemed to be imbued with the 
essence or personality of the author, her or his originality and genius, and the author 
should therefore be granted permission to control the creation (Boyle, 1996).  
Alternatively, there are scholars who subscribe to the utilitarian theory of economic rights 
in copyright.  Copyright is a means to an end.  The government wants to encourage the 
production and dissemination of information and therefore it provides the legal devise of 
copyright as an incentive to authors to write or create (Vaver, 1991, p. 127).   
In North America, state adherence to utilitarian principles is explicit in 
government policy instruments.  Most frequently, American legal scholars refer to the 
Constitution of the United States of America which states that copyright is a limited term 
monopoly granted for the purpose of “promoting the progress of science and the useful 
arts” (U.S. Const. art.I, §8, cl.1). This clause in the Constitution justifies copyright by 
maintaining that it is an incentive structure to promote the production of socially valuable 
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works.10  In Canada, this position has been articulated in the courts.  Justice Binnie of the 
Supreme Court, speaking for the majority of the Court in the recent case of Théberge 
v.Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc (2002), commented: 
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting 
the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of 
the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, 
more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from 
appropriating whatever benefits may be generated). 
This utilitarian position in Canadian and American government is consistent with the 
history of copyright.  Economic rights in copyright historically were drafted as private 
rights, granted to authors, which served the public interest.  
 
(b) Historical origins in England    
Lyman Ray Patterson (1968) demonstrates that the Statute of Anne, titled an An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning and for Securing the Property of Copies of Books 
to the Rightful Owners Thereof and considered by some to be England’s first copyright 
legislation and the first codification of authors’ rights in law, was not, in fact, an 
acknowledgement of the rights and rewards due an author. Patterson notes that there is 
little in the original statute to suggest that the rights of the author were of primary 
importance.  It is far more likely that the legislation was intended to regulate the book 
trade.  Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne, the members of Stationers’ Company 
(the booksellers' guild) were the only individuals who had rights to hold copyright in 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the copyright referred to in the American Constitution is the economic rights in 
copyright:  as will be evident from the following discussion, the Constitution pre-dates the concept of moral 
rights in copyright. 
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works and copyrights existed in perpetuity.  The limited copyright term given by the 
Statute of Anne was to help break up the monopolies that had previously been created in 
the book trade.  Moreover, under the Statute of Anne, copyright was limited to a period of 
years, after which works would again be freely available in a competitive marketplace 
free of monopoly interest (Patterson, 1968, p. 144).  The concept of the author as creative 
genius, therefore, was not what was being recognised in this legislation): “the author was 
used primarily as a weapon against monopoly.” (Patterson, 1968, p. 147)11  Ultimately, 
whether it was consciously a part of the strategy of the drafters of the statute or not, the 
result was that a greater number of texts were made available to an increasingly literate 
public. 
The ingenious idea that was codified by the Statute of Anne (McKeown, 2000, p. 
24) was to give those who needed to invest in the machinery of the new industrialized 
information industries an incentive by separating the facts and ideas behind texts from the 
form of the texts themselves.  This both fit the public perception of information in 
England as a free prerogative of every Englishman (the first part of the title of the act: An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning…) and ensured the free flow of information to 
fuel the creativity necessary to ensure scientific and industrial progress (Randall, 2001, p. 
51).12  On the other hand, by legislating individual rights attaching to aspects of the 
industrial production of information products, it was possible to create an economic 
environment of monopoly incentives for those investing specifically in the machinery of 
text production (the second part of the statute’s title: … and for Securing the Property of 
                                                 
11 Indeed, it also appears unwise to rest the theoretical justification for copyright on such a basis, quite apart 
from the evidence of the historical record, because the romantic view of the author is falling out of favour 
with literary theorists. (Rajan, 2002, p.193). 
12 Marilyn Randall describes the notion of the author developing during the Romantic period into a concept 
of the author as sole source and origin of her or his own discourse.  
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Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners Thereof [emphasis added]).  This ensured that 
enhanced flow of information in society would actually be accomplished using the new 
technology of industrialization because those investing in information technology would 
be rewarded.   
Using the device of the identification of the work with its author in order to 
identify and control copying of the work was timely.  The emphasis on the copies, rather 
than on the works themselves, in the statute’s title, emphasizes the focus on the right to 
copy rather than on the author’s rights.  The right created has been described as “the 
exclusive right of multiplying copies of an original work or composition, and 
consequently preventing others from so doing” (Chappell v. Purday, 1845, p.316, per 
Pollack,C.B.).  The concept created the necessary rewards for investment in the 
dissemination of the new ideas that would further the national economic growth of the 
capitalist state and keep Britain economically at least abreast, if not ahead, of its 
European competitors.13  
 
 (c) Historical origins in France 
The development of the English economic rights in copyright as a trade 
regulation devise is echoed virtually simultaneous development in France of 
                                                 
13 Canada and the United States share a common heritage in copyright until the Independence of the United 
States from Great Britain.  From then on, the experience of copyright in the two jurisdictions begins to 
diverge.  The United States, an information importing country after its Independence, included copyright in 
its Constitution (as discussed below) and created a form of copyright very early in its history, 1790, but did 
not extend that protection to foreign works until 1954 (and even works by foreigners manufactured in the 
United States were not protected in copyright in the United States until 1891). On the other hand, Canada, 
formed almost a century later, in 1867, continued as a colony and then dominion, and thus continued to be 
influenced directly by the British experience until the 1920’s.  By this time Canada and Britain were 
members of the international copyright community of the Berne Convention (which, as discussed below, 
the United States did not join until much later).  Although still officially a colony of Britain until 1931, 
after 1920, Canada began to develop its own copyright environment, influenced by its past, by the Berne 
Convention, and by the languages of its own statute (which was enacted in both English and French). 
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economic rights in copyright, the law of droit d’auteur [literally, “law of the 
author”].14    
Carla Hesse outlines the debates in revolutionary France that culminated 
in the development of its copyright legislation (1990). It has been commonly 
held that authors in France were granted limited copyright in their works out of 
recognition for their role in the creation of knowledge. In order to challenge that 
presumption, Hesse examined the contemporary debate that raged between 
Denis Diderot and Marie-Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de 
Condorcet.  The former argued that ideas emanate from the author, and therefore 
the author should have unlimited property rights to her or his work.  The latter 
argued that ideas exist in nature and the author is merely the medium for 
communicating those ideas to the public.  The author, under this latter 
perspective, is accountable to the public and should not have property in ideas.  
Hesse demonstrates that the French legislation drafted after this debate was a 
compromise between these two positions.  French copyright legislation, 
although known in France as droit d’auteur, was not created to reward the 
genius of the author.   
Hesse argues the abolition of the privileges of the publishers in France, 
which had existed in the pre-revolutionary ancien regime, in favour of a limited 
economic right in copyright was actually done in the interest of the public, not 
out of respect for the personal rights of the author (1990, p. 130). The 
elimination of the royal “privilege” system, in favour of “property” rights, 
                                                 
14 The Canadian copyright legislation is called, in English, the Copyright Act and, in French, Loi sur le 
Droit d’Auteur.  Both the English and French texts of the law are official.  
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actually resulted in a loss of power and control for the French publishers.  The 
beneficiary of the change in legislation was the public.  Hesse suggests that these 
new author rights were understood to be serving the public interest.   
The post-revolutionary changes to the French legislation governing 
theatrical works are prime examples of Hesse’ premise.  The authors of 
theatrical works lobbied for the abolition of the system of privileges since it 
favoured the publishers, not the public.  They asked for copyright in their names, 
in the interest of the public.   
The authors represented themselves as servants of the public good, of its 
enlightenment, in opposition to the private interests of publishers and 
theatre directors.  Thus the authors themselves rejected the Diderotist 
argument…[and] presented themselves as contributors to “public 
property and guardians of the public claim to the nation’s cultural 
commons (Hesse, 1990, p.126).    
The significance of the playwrights’ position is not only their concern for the 
public interest but that they position themselves between the publishers or 
theatre directors and the public.  They saw themselves as mediators between a 
cultural commons, belonging to the public, and those who were attempting to 
benefit from a monopoly in texts.   
 
(d) Why a legal response to economic change was necessary 
We have established the public interest in the economic rights in copyright (droit 
d’auteur) from their historical roots in both England and France but, further, we will 
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argue that it is this public interest in the economic rights in copyright which determined 
their timely appearance in history.  Copyright began as an artificially created legal 
response to changing economies in Europe (Bettig, 1996, p. 11, 16).15   The immediate 
economic stimuli for the creation of economic rights in copyright and the regime of 
patent are the print revolution and the industrial revolutions, respectively.  It must be 
noted that the two revolutions were inextricably connected and that the printing press was 
as much an artefact of industrialization in its revolutionary impact on text as any other 
invention of the industrial revolution was in its economic sector (Randall, 2001, p.65).16 
The radical effects of the printing press on European society have certainly been noted 
(Eisenstein, 1979) -- but its impacts on two different elements of communication have not 
been as well understood in subsequent analysis:  the elites controlling the flows of 
information and the channels through which audiences were best reached.   
William Caxton is commonly credited as the first to introduce the printing press 
into England in 1476. At first, foreign presses were encouraged.  For example, between 
1484 and 1533, a statute regulating and restricting foreign businesses in England had an 
exemption for printing and bookselling (1 Rich. III, c.9).  However, this was shortly 
replaced by attempts to encourage and protect the indigenous press industry by licensing 
beginning on November 16, 1538 under Henry VIII (Steele, Procl. No.176). In May 
1557, the Stationers’ Guild was given a royal charter and charged with maintaining the 
monopoly over printing and publishing in England.  This system culminated in the 
                                                 
15 Ronald Bettig does trace roots for copyright back to the Roman publishing system but agrees that the role 
of copyright in the European context was an advent of the invention of the printing press in 1450.  
16 Our current economic environment has similarly been termed both the post-industrial age and the 
information age. Both the printing revolution and current information age have begun with text and then 
moved to affect the distribution of artworks and musical notation (in the case of the printing revolution) and 
music itself (in the case of the information age).   
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Licensing Act of 1662 (13 & 14 Car.II, c.33). These early efforts to require printing 
presses to be licensed were attempts to continue the control of the channels of 
communication of texts by the existing elites:  to continue control of those 
communications that were not immediate in terms of time and place, that is, 
communications that were not oral, or at least aural, and to limit them to the existing 
elites.  John S. McKeown states: 
…in response to the divergence of religious belief during the 
Reformation, the clerics came to rely on printing as a means to control 
doctrine and prohibitions.  In 1401 a statute was passed for the 
suppression and punishment of heretical writings and in 1529, Henry 
VIII published a list of prohibited books, followed by a proclamation 
relating to religious books the next year. …One of the first official acts 
of Elizabeth after her accession was the issue in 1558 of a proclamation 
requiring the burning of all heretical books (2000, p. 15-16).  
This proved impossible – and, indeed, the economic revolutions, of which the print 
revolution was a part, ultimately ended up redefining the elites themselves throughout 
Europe.  The new elites were based upon ownership and control of the engines of 
industrial production rather than upon ownership and control of agricultural production 
and land (Beattie, 1987, p. 22). 
 
(e) The effects of the economic rights in copyright 
Recognition of the controlling elites of the new engines of information production 
began through the legal creation of the copyright. Through the legal fiction of the 
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copyright, the investment required for the industrialization of the dissemination of text 
was encouraged and protected – but the economic rights of copyright did not secure to 
the copyright holders the exclusive right to communicate particular information – only to 
communicate a particular container (text or artwork) of that information. 17  
The largest possible audience for texts and artworks after the printing press was 
invented was the audience that was available once the work was identically replicated 
through the printing press.  Copyright boosted the value of this replication by ensuring 
that each work had a national monopoly to exploit.  The only way to fully exploit the 
creation of a work is to reach the largest possible market: most authors and artists have 
chosen to avail themselves of the possibilities created by the industrialization of the 
production of the containers of information.18  Since the artists and authors usually did 
not control the new print technology, their access to its possibilities was indirect, through 
the industrialists who did control it.  Since, with the demise of the old elites, access to 
                                                 
17 Other competing containers of that same information were not precluded – and, indeed, were equally 
encouraged.  On one level, there was a reality and a benefit in this encouragement of multiple containers of 
the same information, particularly since, at this stage, all the containers of information were 
representational. There were real differences between the texts of speeches as reported, for example, and 
the words as delivered.  There were real differences between a scene viewed and the paintings rendered by 
various artists from those scenes.  And only the representations could be captured and conveyed to 
audiences distant in time or in space – not the actual speeches or images themselves.  Since only the 
representations could be captured before sound recordings and photographs were invented, copyright was 
created to attach to the representations:  the works.  And the representations were the complete universe of 
subject matter available to the then fledgling publishing industry. Copyright did have an effect on the 
control of channels of communication:  each work’s, or expression’s, or container’s, channel was controlled 
almost exclusively by that container’s copyright holder.  But since there could be multiple containers for 
any given idea or fact, there was no exclusive control over channels for distribution of particular 
information.  As the technology of the sound recording and the photograph emerged, there was scepticism 
in many quarters about whether they deserved copyright protection: only very gradually and grudgingly did 
the international community come to accept them as appropriate subject matter for copyright:  for example,  
photographs were not included as fully protected works in the original Berne Convention of 1886 and 
continued as less than fully recognized for decades afterwards. 
18 Certainly, with the demise of the old elites, the best access to support for the artists and writers was to 
access the new elites:  the industrialists, who, in turn, recouped their investments in “their” artists and 
writers and in their publishing technology by accessing the new mass audiences available through 
publishing.  This, of course, meant most artists and writers chose to indirectly profit from the newly 
enlarged audiences for their work by, also indirectly, accessing the technology of publishing. 
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aristocratic patrons for artists and writers was virtually extinguished, the best access to 
support became access to the new elites.  In turn the industrial printers and publishers 
recouped their investments and their business risk in “their” artists and writers and in 
their publishing technology by accessing the new mass audiences available through 
publishing.  What they demanded of “their” artists and writers, in return, was assignment 
of those artists’ and writers’ copyright interests. 
The many aspects of the copyright holder’s control can be seen in the rights 
copyright law has given to them:  the right to copy, the right to adapt, the right to 
perform, and so on.  The original copyright holder can transfer each of these rights to 
others.  Thus copyright enables a whole network of channels for distribution of an 
author’s work – and control of each channel can rest with a different copyright holder.  
On the other hand, since there can be multiple containers, or works, for any given idea or 
fact, even the network of control associated with a given work does not create exclusive 
control over the channel for distribution of particular information.19 
Publishing technology became widespread in society because there was an 
incentive created through copyright for investing in it.  The way that copyright created an 
incentive for the industrial production of text (and then, somewhat later, for industrial 
production of musical scores and art reproductions) was to artificially create a scarcity in 
                                                 
19 The extension in the United States of the copyright legislation to include regulation over the contents of 
databases through the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 1998 [DMCA] challenges the traditional distinction 
in copyright law that ideas and facts must be allowed to circulate freely in society.  Many would argue that 
the DMCA, although located within copyright legislation, is law of a different nature.  Canada has so far 
refrained from altering its copyright legislation to include DMCA-type provisions, although it has signed 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty of 1996 which, some argue, requires 
DMCA-type provisions.  In Canada, Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, introduced June 20, 
2005 would have introduced American-style protections, particularly in ss. 27 and 34, but failed to pass 
before Parliament was dissolved. Canada’s Parliament is currently considering Bill C-61 An Act to Amend 
the Copyright Act, which passed First Reading June 17, 2008.  If passed, it would introduce a unique 
version of technological protection measures.  The discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy herein 
focuses on copyright as originally conceived – before the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
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the underlying work upon which the copyright holders could then capitalize.  This was by 
initially identifying each work uniquely with its author. However, once an artist or writer 
who held the original copyright chose to access the industrial tools of publication, as 
described above, the artist or writer was almost invariably required by the new industrial 
elite, those who controlled the presses, to give up control of the original work. A petition 
presented to Parliament in 1709 echoed exactly this situation: 
It has been constant usage of the writers of books to sell their copies to 
booksellers, or printers, to the end they [the printers and booksellers] might hold 
those copies as their property, and enjoy the benefit of making, and vending, 
impressions of them:  yet divers persons have of late invaded the properties of 
others by reprinting several books, without the consent and to the great injury of 
the proprietors [again the booksellers and printers], even to their utter ruin, and 
the discouragement of all writers in any useful part of learning ( McKeown, 2000, 
p. 24, quoting Jo. H.C. xvi, 240a).  
 
The regime of economic rights in copyright appears to have survived precisely 
because it favours those who have become the dominant elite:  the industrialists. 
Production of text, musical scores and artwork became industrialized just at the dawn of 
the period during which those who controlled industrial processes have become the elite 
– and copyright first ensured the transition of text production to an industrialized process 
and then has served to maintain the economic viability of that production.   
Eventually, in the late nineteenth century, the dominance of copyright as 
an effective vehicle for advancing national economic agendas was signalled by 
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the creation in 1886 of the international Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works.  The crux of the Berne Convention was the 
agreement between member states that a work entitled to the copyright 
monopoly in one member state would be respected as copyrighted in other 
member states (the principle of national treatment) and that copyright holders 
would be entitled to the same minimum rights set out in the treaty in all member 
states.  Thus the principle that an original work carries with it a national 
monopoly over certain uses for a period of time became extended to create a 
system of international monopoly among member states. 
 Joining Berne was advantageous for information-exporting countries. 
The United States, which was, in the nineteenth century, still an information-
importing nation, did not join the Berne Convention, although its Constitution 
recognized copyright and it had created a domestic copyright regime.20 
Nonetheless, as Sam Ricketson points out: 
Despite [its] relatively limited membership, the geographical sweep of the 
new Union was considerable when account is taken of the colonial 
possessions of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain and the U.K.... [As 
late as 1987] it still … retains clear evidence of its Old World origins and 
orientations (Rickets on, 1987, p. 79-80). 
 Shortly after joining the Berne Convention in 1989, the United States, now an 
information-exporting country, was instrumental in bringing the provisions of the 
Convention pertaining to the economic rights in copyright into the international trade 
                                                 
20 Indeed, the United States did not join the “Berne” community until it realized, in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, that it had become a net exporter of information (Samuels, 2000, p.7). 
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environment of the newly formed World Trade Organization.  TRIPS (Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which is appended to the World 
Trade Organization Agreement of 1994, incorporates most of the Berne Convention by 
reference (Article 9(1)), bringing the principles of the economic rights into a still larger 
community of nations (virtually all nations) and adding the coercion of trade sanctions to 
ensure that its provisions are implemented in each country’s domestic laws. 
 This history demonstrates that although there is a robust rhetoric surrounding the 
concept of the author in the economic rights sphere of copyright, and although it is true 
that the author is fundamental to the conception of the economic rights in copyright, the 
identification of the author with the work in relation to the economic rights in copyright 
really functions to uniquely identify the work, as the identity of the author functions in 
librarianship in its role as an aid to access and in bibliographic control.  The history of 
these economic rights demonstrates that, through assignment, the industrial elites 
routinely end up with control over these rights in works, rather than the authors and 
artists – which is exactly what these economic rights were specifically designed to do 
when created in eighteenth century Europe.21 
 These older and original aspects of copyright, the economic rights, therefore, 
demonstrably cannot function to protect the relationship between the author and the text:  
once the author has assigned the economic rights, or in situations where the author was 
never given the statutory right to control the economic rights, the author loses control 
over these aspects of the work.  Thus economic rights cannot, in and of themselves, 
                                                 
21 In current copyright law, moreover, authors are surgically and completely removed from active 
participation in the economic rights environment by provisions that vest the copyright  in employment 
situations with the employer, not the employee.  In the United States, the vesting applies to an even larger 
group than in Canada:  to all “works made for hire.” 
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function to support either use of the author’s identity as a mechanism for quality 
judgements about the work or reliance upon the author to control the integrity of the work 
as initially conceived.  Those who seek indications of the authority for information 
presented in a work must look elsewhere. 
 
 3.  The Characteristics, Role and History of the Moral Rights in Copyright 
 
a) Historical origins 
Moral rights for authors, unlike the economic rights in copyright, have only fairly 
recently come to be recognized: they can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century in 
French case law (Sarraute, 1968, Goudreau, 1993, p. 405).   
Until the twentieth century, there were no moral rights recognised in North 
America.  The earliest copyright legislation affecting Canada did not include any aspect 
of moral rights protection. The current Canadian Copyright Act, when it was first passed 
in 1921 and came into force in 1924, included no aspect of moral rights protection.  
Beginning the year that new Copyright Act came into force, there were repeated, 
unsuccessful, attempts made to add moral rights protections to the Canadian legislation 
—in 1924, 1925, 1926, and 1927 (Canada).   
Internationally, moral rights only came to be included in the Berne Convention 
when it was revised at the Rome Conference in 1928.22  At that Conference, the Italian 
                                                 
22 Even as early as 1928 it was noted that: “it is henceforth beyond doubt that the creator of a literary and 
artistic work retains rights in the product of his intellectual effort that are above and outside all agreements 
on disposal.  Those rights, which for want of a more adequate expression are called moral rights, are 
distinguished from economic rights, and assignment of the latter leaves the former intact [italics added].” 
(International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1986, p.165). 
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delegation drafted the most comprehensive proposal for the inclusion of moral rights 
(Ricketson, 1987, p. 106, 460).  In so doing, they described these rights as follows: 
It should be mentioned that the shift of focus that has occurred in legal 
doctrine in favour of the protection of personal copyright has recently 
taken on a more general, more uniform and more precise character, in 
spite of the divergent theories on the nature of copyright ( …) it is 
agreed today that, independently of the exclusive rights of economic 
character, which are essentially temporary and transferable, the author 
does own one right, or a set of rights strictly inherent in his person, that 
are intransferable and without limitation in time, and which mainly 
concern the absolute right to publish or not to publish the work, to 
recognition of authorship and finally to the protection of the integrity in 
the work… (International Union for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, 1986, p. 163). 
 
The Subcommittee on Moral Rights for the 1928 Conference reported 
and recommended adoption of much of the Italian delegation’s memorandum – 
but only incorporated the right of attribution or paternity and the right of 
integrity into its proposed text for moral rights protection.23  The right of 
                                                 
23 Indeed, one concern that is raised about moral rights is that there are a number of rights that are claimed 
in various jurisdictions to be moral rights but are not found in other jurisdictions; for example, the right of 
divulgation, the right of withdrawal (to remove the work from the public), the right of association (of the 
work with certain causes or products, of which there will be further discussion below).  One of the 
functions of this analysis will be to determine which rights contribute to the information policy object here 
claimed for moral rights in copyright.  This is not to say that other rights should not be legislated, but only 
to say that such legislation should not form part of the moral rights in copyright and must therefore be 
justified on other grounds.  Both the rights currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as will be seen, 
contribute to the information policy object here outlined for moral rights in copyright. 
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divulgation or disclosure (the right to publish or not publish) was excluded from 
the final draft, as a compromise over the emerging divergence between views of 
copyright as essentially property based and views of copyright as essentially 
personal rights (Goudreau, 1993, p. 409).   
While it is plausible that the right of divulgation may be implicit in the 
Berne Convention rights which have been expressly articulated (Ricketson, 
1987, p. 476), it will be argued here that such a right is not necessary to the 
social function of moral rights. 
The resulting wording of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (the article 
providing moral rights)  in 1928 was: 
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after 
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to 
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor 
or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable 
by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the 
country where protection is claimed. However, those countries 
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or 
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accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the 
death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his 
death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by 
this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country 
where protection is claimed. 
Moral rights in copyright, in accordance with the Berne Convention, then, must 
include at least the right to attribution or paternity and the right to integrity, but 
may include other rights.  These rights must be legislated as permanent, non-
transferable rights of the author whereas, at any time, an individual or 
organization other than the author may well hold the economic rights to an 
author’s work.  Although the original proposal of the Italian delegation in 1928 
defined these rights as “not time limited,” the Berne Convention actually accepts 
any length of protection as long as these rights last at least through the author’s 
lifetime.  Finally, these moral rights are to attach to all works to which the 
economic rights attach. 
b) Canada as an early adopter 
 
Canada became, for the first time in its own right, signatory to the Berne 
Convention at the Rome Copyright Convention in 1928.24 Three years after moral rights 
were added to the Berne Convention at that Rome Convention, in 1931, Canada amended 
                                                 
24 It may be recalled that, prior to this, Canada had been part of the Berne environment through Great 
Britain. 
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its Copyright Act (1931, s.5) to add them.   Canada thus became the first common law 
country to introduce moral rights into its domestic legislation. The wording was virtually 
identical to the wording of the 1928 Berne Convention. 25 
A number of other countries have eventually followed suit by adding moral rights 
provisions to their copyright legislation.  India was another fairly early adopter (Eagles 
and Longdin, 2004, p. 216).26 France, where, as described, moral rights had for sometime 
been recognized by the courts, only added moral rights provisions to its copyright 
legislation in 1957 (Loi no. 296).  England only more recently followed suit by amending 
its legislation in 1988 to include limited moral rights in some situations (Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act (U.K.)). The last century, therefore, saw a slow evolution of 
moral rights legislation in the Western world.  
Canada revised its moral rights provisions in 1988, and completely reworded 
them, to include what can be identified as three distinct types of moral rights: the right to 
attribution or paternity and the right to integrity in the work (which, as described, had 
already been protected, albeit in another form,27 since 1924) and the right to association 
                                                 
25 The following wording, which was virtually identical to the Berne Convention wording as it then was 
passed: 
Section twelve of the said Act is hereby amended by adding thereto the following subsection: 
(5) Independently of the author’s copyright, and even after the assignment, either wholly or 
partially, of the said copyright, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, as 
well as the right to restrain any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work which 
would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.  
26 Like Canada, India, another former British colony, passed moral rights legislation as it joined the Berne 
Convention in its own right. 
27 It may be noted in the quotation below  that the right to attribution or paternity is modified after the 1988 
amendments in Canada in two ways:  first, it must be “reasonable in the circumstances” for attribution to 
occur, and second, it arises in connection with an act mentioned in s.3.  S.3 is the section setting out the 
economic rights in a work.  In particular, in s.3 of the Canadian statute, it provides that the economic rights 
arise in connection with the whole work or “any substantial part thereof.”  The Canadian provisions 
illustrate the fact that moral rights need not be legislated such that one must be concerned with them (or, for 
that matter, the economic rights) in connection with quotation of insubstantial portions of works.  This put 
to rest a concern raised by Hazel Bell (2003) that moral rights inevitably have a censoring effect on 
scholarship. 
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(which was added in 1988).  The terminology and arrangement in the current Canadian 
legislation are somewhat confusing, however, in terms of identifying the three rights in 
language that parallels the terminology used by other authorities.  The right to attribution 
or paternity appears in the Canadian statute as: 
s.14.1(1) The author of a work, has … in connection with an act 
mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in the 
circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author by name or 
under a pseudonym … 
 
The right to integrity appears as: 
s.14.1(1) The author of a work, has, subject to section 28.1(1) the right 
to the integrity of the work … 
and 
s.28.1(1) The author’s right to the integrity of a work is infringed only 
if the work is, to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author,  
(a)distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified. 
 
And, finally, the newer right to association (McKeown, 2000 and Sterling, 1999), still 
using the language of “integrity,” appears as: 
s.28.1(1) The author’s right to the integrity of a work is infringed only 
if the work is, to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author, 
… 
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(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or 
institution. 
 
As described, development of moral rights in any domestic law lagged 
considerably behind the development of the economic rights in copyright and it was not 
until fifty years after the first Berne Convention that consideration was given to the 
inclusion of moral rights provisions in this original international agreement on copyright. 
Even now, while “[m]ost of the world’s copyright systems now incorporate or attach a 
moral rights component these vary widely, not only in detail but also in their origins and 
theoretical underpinnings.” (Eagles & Longdin, 2004, p. 210). The United States, which 
is now a signatory to the Berne Convention and leading proponent of strong foreign and 
international intellectual property protection, still does not have significant moral rights 
provisions in its copyright legislation. 28 In fact, the inclusion of moral rights protection 
in the Berne Convention was one of the stumbling blocks for many years to the accession 
of the United States to the Convention (Sterling, 1999, p. 280).  And, indeed, the United 
States was instrumental in ensuring that the TRIPS Agreement does not include moral 
                                                 
28 In 1990 the United States enacted the little-used Visual Artists’ Rights Act.  The statute only applies to 
original works of art where there are 200 or fewer signed and numbered reproductions of that art – and does 
not apply in the digital context.  The enactment has a further huge gap in its already limited scope:  in 
defining the works of visual art to which it applies, the legislation states, “a work of visual art does not 
include any work made for hire.” (s.101).  This latter provision neatly avoids what many Americans 
perceive as a problematic situation, in which the artist “author” might disagree in a given situation with the 
“employer” owner of the economic rights in a work, by, in effect, providing no moral rights at all in an 
employment situation.  This American enactment, then, sidesteps a major tenet inherent in the Berne 
Convention conception of moral rights:  the moral rights of the artist are to be independent of the economic 
rights in copyright – the moral rights are meant to be able to rest in the author’s hands even when the 
economic rights rest elsewhere.  The rights under this American legislation last for the artist’s lifetime – 
and artists are permitted to waive their rights.  It should be noted that, although very narrow, it appears that 
a number of American libraries have had experience with this legislation in terms of dealing with 
sculptures, murals or other art decoration (see Gasaway, 2002). 
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rights.29 Moral rights protection has spread slowly, both more slowly and more recently 
than protection of the economic rights in copyright.  There are, however, inherent reasons 
why moral rights protection should be increasingly embraced by nations in the emerging 
information age. 
 
c) The Public Purpose of Moral Rights 
Despite the fact that Canada was the first common law country to codify moral 
rights, and significantly expanded moral rights provision in 1988, no coherent theory or 
purpose for moral rights has been articulated in Canadian government policy documents. 
  It has been briefly stated a few times that the purpose of moral rights is to protect 
the reputation of the author (Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1984 p. 26; House 
of Commons Debates, 1988, p.127600; Nordicity Group, 1994, p. 33). Canadian policy 
makers and theorists adhering to this position are appealing once again to the romantic 
conception of the author (discussed earlier in connection with the economic rights in 
copyright).  Moral rights provisions, according to this theory, assume a bond between the 
author and the work.  In order to preserve integrity for the author, one must preserve the 
integrity of the work or use the work as the author intended (the right of association).  
This theoretical justification would be consistent with the approach, emanating from civil 
law countries, ascribe moral rights to protection of the personality of the author.  For 
example, the bond that exists between the author and the work is expressed by Sarraute, 
in his discussion of moral rights in France: 
                                                 
29 On the other hand, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (moral rights), was not left out of the 
incorporation by reference of the Berne Convention into the North American Free Trade Agreement 
[NAFTA] between the United States, Canada and Mexico in 1994 and so, under NAFTA, though not under 
TRIPS, the United States is obliged to go much further to fully implement its Berne Convention 
commitment to moral rights for authors. 
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It includes non-property attributes of an intellectual and moral character 
which give legal expression to the intimate bond which exists between 
a literary or artistic work and its author’s personality; it is intended to 
protect his personality as well as his work (1968, p. 465). 
Reeves Van Kirk confirms this position, noting: “French case law and statutes are 
permeated with the humanistic, even metaphysical notion that a creative work is, much 
more than an item of property, an extension of the very personality of the creative artist” 
(1984, p. 7). 
As compelling and romantic as this argument may be, it is inconsistent with the 
stated government objectives for the copyright regime as a whole in Canada.  In a policy 
statement made before the 1988 amendments to the Copyright Act, the Canadian 
government made it explicit that there were two primary goals for copyright reform: (1) 
to encourage creative work and (2) ensure the greatest number of Canadians could benefit 
from the advances in technology (Department of Communications, 1984, p. 2).  The 
relationship between the moral rights provisions and the stated goals of the copyright 
reform effort is not explained in the documents.   
In order for the Canadian government to be consistent with historical tradition and 
its own stated purposes for the Copyright Act and government policy in the governance of 
information, there must be a public purpose or benefit to moral rights.  And, indeed, more 
generally, Gary Lea (2001-2) has concluded, from his review of the origins of moral 
rights and their modern status, that “the claims that moral rights are not a public interest 
issue and that they have nothing to do with economic or marketplace matters because of 
their personal, non-pecuniary nature are … not sustainable (p.77)”. 
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There has, in fact, been some limited articulation of a public purpose for moral 
rights in Canada.  Consumer and Corporate Affairs argued, prior to the 1988 Copyright 
Act amendments, that the right of paternity could potentially protect both the author and 
the public.   The right of paternity was said to work not only for the protection of the 
author “but also for the public, which has an interest in not being misled as to the origin 
of a work” (Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1984, p. 26).  At about the same time, 
outside government,  the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, also 
recognised that the public benefits from moral rights legislation (1985, p. 5).  The 
Association also noted that moral rights could protect Canada’s cultural and artistic 
heritage since the author’s right to the integrity of the work could help to preserve the 
work but, it said, this purpose should be more clearly articulated (1985, p. 5). 
The precise public interest in moral rights remains to be demonstrated.  The social 
bargain for granting moral rights to authors cannot be the same as that argued for the 
economic rights in copyright:  it cannot be said, as it can be in the arena of the economic 
rights, that the creation of moral rights has created an incentive for the further distribution 
of works by industrialized processes beyond that which can occur by pre-industrialized 
methods.   Indeed, when the holder of an economic interest afforded by copyright is 
different from the author, who continues to control the moral rights, the moral rights can 
be a limitation on the power of the copyright holder (Wilkinson, 2003-4, p.44; Lea, 2001-
2) and on the power of the copyright holder to grant further rights or uses.30  Since moral 
                                                 
30 Mark Bide (2003) cites examples on the web where authors have given notice that a work may be freely 
copied and distributed, but only “as long as it is not altered in any way,” (p.107, italics in the original) , 
that is,  giving permission concerning their economic rights to control copying and distribution, but only on 
condition that their moral right, the right to integrity, is respected.  Nicholas Joint (2006) points out, in the 
British context, that certain changes to British copyright legislation has made it easier for libraries to make 
copies to accommodate the visually impaired – but those changes did not override the moral rights of 
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rights do not create the same incentives as the economic rights in copyright do, the 
existence of moral rights does not serve society by encouraging a larger dissemination of 
information (which is the social benefit derived from the economic rights). Therefore, 
society does not receive any enhanced access to information from the existence of moral 
rights.   
Research has established, however, that individuals need more than access to 
various sources of information in order to have their information needs satisfied, they 
also need to be able to select between competing sources of information (Lynch, 2001, p. 
16; Wilkinson, 2001, p. 272-274).  Individuals need to be satisfied about the authority 
behind a particular information source:  obviously where there is an information need, the 
ability to personally judge the accuracy of sources located will be lacking.31  
The ability to identify source (and, therefore, to judge the authority of the source) 
will be a particularly important requirement in an era when the available containers of 
information are all representational:  when there may be many aspects of an idea or fact 
presented through various representations. As Heather MacNeil discusses in an archival 
context:  
Records are viewed as a source of information that permit us to make 
inferences about the real world.  Because they are assumed to reflect 
events in the real world, records depend for their reliability on the claim 
of the recordkeeper to have been present at those events.  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                 
authors and so libraries must exercise their new rights while still ensuring that the rights of attribution and 
integrity held by the authors of works are not impaired. 
31 If you know in and of itself that a piece of information is true, then you don’t have a need to know that 
piece of information – if you must rely on an external source to supply you with information, its accuracy 
must be unknown to you and therefore its source is important to you in order to judge its reliability.  As 
further discussed below, the development of the law of trademark in the commercial environment of goods 
is another development serving a similar social purpose. 
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the methods for assessing record trustworthiness aim to ensure that the 
record accurately reflects those events, and that it is uncontaminated by 
the distorting influence of bias, interpretation, or unwarranted opinion 
on the part of recordkeeper (MacNeil, 2000, p. 115). 
In a rigidly hierarchical society, where elites control the channels of information, 
the containers of information may not need to be identified individually by users in order 
to confirm their authority and be accepted as satisfying information needs.  The Church 
in the Middle Ages, for example, controlled many of the distribution channels in Europe.  
Users of information who questioned the veracity of the sources being distributed by the 
Church were charged with being unorthodox (Randall, 2001 p. 33). Secular information 
has also historically been controlled by elites.  Demonstration of the authority of the 
sources of information was part of the origin of documents “under seal” (MacNeil, 2000, 
p. 5). Official seals were used on documents, by members of the elite, in order to ensure 
the authority of the documents.32   
In the rapidly evolving society of the industrial and print revolutions, other 
indications of the authority of information became established in order to minimize 
reliance upon misinformation and ensure that wider information dissemination pushed 
forward the progress of society (Hughes, 1999, p 923-1010).  These indications included 
identification of works with the presses and publishers from which they emanated.  
However, even in the nineteenth century, presses were proliferating.  In library and 
information science terms, there was an increasing problem with establishing the 
reliability of “grey literature,” literature emanating from publishers or presses that were 
                                                 
32 Heather MacNeil notes that archiving itself was also controlled and limited to those in authority (2000, p. 
2). 
  
 
31 
not well known.  Questions about the authority of texts and of other containers of 
information were beginning to arise.  Concomitantly, the notion of moral rights in 
copyright appeared. 
 
d) The new bargain: The role of the rights of paternity and integrity 
 
Analysis of the underlying effects of the moral rights and economic right regimes 
indicates that the two are both involved in influencing the flow of information in a 
society. However, their roles are distinct, because each regime is related to a different 
aspect, or property, of the containers of information.  Economic rights affect the supply 
of information that is available and hence access to information in a society, and moral 
rights affect the information seeker’s ability to judge the quality of the available 
information sources and to thus select from amongst competing sources. 
Moral rights strike a balance between the right to transform a work for profit or 
creativity and the right to the integrity of the work which will preserve its cultural or 
social value. Moral rights can be invoked by an author to oppose an economic rights 
holder’s exploitation of the work in a way deemed to harm the reputation of the author.  
Furthermore, where a moral rights regime is in place, an economic rights holder can 
exercise the economic copyright to distribute a work only so long as the work is 
attributed to the author.  Adaptation of a work through the exercise of the economic right 
of copyright, for further profit, can be limited if it prejudices the integrity of the author or 
the author’s work.  Similarly, moral rights, as legislated in Canada, permit authors to 
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object to the use of their works to promote particular products or services, even though 
they have no economic copyright interest or private property interest in the works.   
What is the social bargain that has permitted the moral rights regime to endure 
and spread?  
The right of paternity or attribution serves society’s interest in ascertaining 
authority and identifying works with a particular source.  The right of an author to be 
known by name or pseudonym, when exercised by the author, can contribute an 
indication of authority to a work.33  Its existence assists the public by identifying a work 
with a particular source:  its author.  In return, the authors of works are given particular 
unassignable elements of control over their creativity despite the separate existence of the 
economic copyright interests, which are designed to be transferable, and which, in any 
case, are not necessarily vested by the law in the creators themselves (for example, in the 
employment situation). 
As the right of paternity does, the right of integrity also serves the public interest.  
Justin Hughes notes that critics of strong intellectual property regimes focus upon users’ 
rights to access intellectual works (1999).  The defence of users’ rights always centres 
upon the need to access works to transform, adapt or use intellectual property in order to 
produce new works or new meaning.  Hughes does not dispute the need for such activity 
but he fears that in focusing upon the production of new works, another user interest is 
ignored.  Users, he argues, are also interested in the stability of meaning or value of 
                                                 
33 Frequently the paternity right has also been taken to include the author’s right to remain anonymous (see, 
for example, Canada’s s.14.1, which is quoted in part above.  The entire section as enacted includes not 
only the quoted “right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author 
by name or under a pseudonym” but also the concluding “right to remain anonymous.”  The theory of 
moral rights being described here does not recognize the option of the author to remain anonymous as a 
valid contribution to the system of moral rights, although it may well be appropriate legislation for a 
country to have in place for other reasons (Wilkinson, 2006). 
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cultural products.  In other words, the user is interested in preserving the integrity of the 
work.    
While the rights of paternity and integrity are the rights that the international 
community has enshrined in the Berne Convention, there are, as mentioned above, other 
rights which can contribute to the function of moral rights but which have not been 
universally adopted.  For example, as quoted earlier, the Canadian legislation includes a 
right of association.34 This right of association permits the authors to object to the use of 
their works to promote a product or service, even though they may have no economic 
copyright interest or private property interest in the work. They can thus ensure that the 
public reputation of their work is reliably as they intend.  It thus provides further 
assurance to the public by reliably protecting the author’s reputation.35 
The rights of paternity, integrity and association can be defended as serving the 
public’s interest in creating legal assurances of the sources of works in order that 
members of the public may assess the authority of those works.  The right to integrity 
preserves the author’s right to control the content of the work and thus the public’s right 
to be assured that a work represented to emanate from that author is in fact as the author 
constructed it.  The right to paternity or attribution allows an author to insist that her or 
his identity is attached to the work and thus functions in much the same way as trademark 
is intended to function (as a reliable indication of source for the public). The right of 
                                                 
34 It has been argued that this right to association is not a new or different moral right but is simply an 
extension of the right of the author to protect his or her integrity by protecting the integrity, not just of a 
particular work, but of the whole of her or his oeuvre by ensuring that no element of contextual placement 
of any work is able to obscure the author’s intended context (see Le Nordet, Inc. v.82558 Canada Ltee 
(1978), decided under Canada’s Copyright Act before the 1988 amendments, and see, further, Goudreau 
(1994)).  However, the language of the Canadian statute since 1988 appears to lead to possibilities beyond 
the concept of integrity as embedded in the Berne Convention. 
35 In a similar vein, in France, where moral rights are perpetual and inherited after the author’s death, the 
granddaughter of artist Henri Rousseau successfully objected to the use of a reproduction of one of his 
paintings in a promotional display in a Paris department store (Merryman and Elsen, 1987,p.155). 
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association permits the author to protect the integrity of the work by ensuring that no 
contextual displacement changes the meaning of the work.36 Moral rights provisions are 
an attempt to find a balance between the incentive to benefit from the commercial 
adaptation or exploitation of the work and the preservation of the social significance of 
the work.  This is a balance similar to, but distinct from, the balance struck by the 
economic rights in copyright.  Moral rights are private rights that should be granted to the 
author but are ultimately designed to serve the interests of the public.  They, like the 
economic rights in copyright, are private rights for public ends.  
The eighteenth century information needs of societies caught up in the industrial 
economy were met through the economic rights in copyright in combination with 
authority controls exercised by elites.  Since the late nineteenth century, revolutions in 
communications technology have caused another shift in our social and economic fabric.  
In the twentieth century, the sources of information multiplied and the channels of 
information distribution were similarly augmented, and one important result has been the 
decline in the ability of elites to provide the imprimatur of authority on the dissemination 
of information.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the development of the moral rights 
regime lagged behind the development of the copyright regime.  
In the twenty-first century, revolutionary technology is again the engine driving a 
“new economy” – but specifically, now, communications and information technology.  
The new wealth is being created, not in the industrialized processes of the industrial and 
                                                 
36 While the right of association can be analyzed, as we have done here, as connected with the maintainance 
of a recognizable authority in a work, this connection to the work is more indirectly connected to a 
particular work than the connections which we have established in the cases of the rights of paternity and 
integrity.  While we agree that the right of association is a possible element of a moral rights regime, we do 
not argue that the right of association is a necessary element of the moral rights regime. 
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print revolutions, but in the information flows (Machlup, 1983)37 of the new information 
revolution.  As Bruce Doern and Markus Sharaput describe in their institutional analysis 
of the Canadian intellectual property policy environment, the Canadian Intellectual 
Property Office, the Commissioner of Patents and  the Registrar of Trademarks have 
emerged from almost total obscurity as technical operating agencies in the 1990’s to 
agencies now very important to Canada’s capacity to be both innovative and 
internationally competitive (2000, p. 99). Suddenly the ownership and control of ideas 
and facts are not the drivers permitting the new wealth to be created, they are the new 
wealth.   
As a result of this shift, the need for the social and economic roles played by 
moral rights has been increasing. Paul Vandoren, for example, specifically recognizes 
possibilities for increasing exercise of moral rights, although not really articulating why 
this role should be given to the authors and artists he identifies:  
Modifications and adaptations of existing works and protected services 
have never been as easy as they are today in the digital environment, 
due to the new technologies.  This trend will continue.  We may see the 
day where almost anybody could change the colours of a film or replace 
the heads of artists and, then, send the film back on the network.  
Whilst these technological innovations are applauded by certain sectors, 
it is not a surprise that they are seen with some unease by others – 
authors and artists.  We may thus face a situation in which rightholders 
will make more use of their moral rights… (Vandoren, 1996, p. 165).  
                                                 
37 Fritz Machlup first articulated the distinction between “information” as a concept implying an objective 
transfer process whereas “knowledge” implies a subjective state.   
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A few years earlier, Kathleen Lu (1994)urged the inclusion of a general moral rights 
regime in American law for virtually the same reasons.   
The system of a grant of private rights (moral rights) by the state to serve the 
public’s need for authority in information is exactly the same approach as was taken in 
the eighteenth century to the need to assure availability of information by granting private 
rights in the economic rights in copyright.  As is the case for the economic rights, the 
states relies upon those who have been given the rights (authors, in the case of moral 
rights, and rightsholders, in the case of economic rights) to exercise their rights, and thus 
influence the public information environment. Not all holders of the economic rights in 
copyright exploit their rights:  many people leave their writings or other works 
undistributed, unpublished and unused, as do their heirs.  However, as has been 
illustrated in the foregoing, the institution of economic rights in copyright has had a 
profound effect upon the societies governed by such law.  It is to be expected that strong 
instantiation of moral rights for authors will have a profound effect on the information 
environment of the future.  Under our analysis, authors and artists should be encouraged 
to exercise their moral rights, particularly in an era when technology makes works fluid 
and impermanent, in order to give the public the opportunity to understand and evaluate 
the origins of particular works. 
Paradoxically, internationally, there has been a trend which may actually reflect 
increasing neglect of moral rights rather than an embracing of these provisions.  Even in 
countries where moral rights provisions exist, such as Canada, these rights may have 
suffered erosion.  Canada, for example, in its 1988 amendments, introduced a waiver 
clause to its moral rights legislation (Copyright Act 1985, s. 14.1(2)). Such a clause may 
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greatly weaken the rights of authors because they may easily be required to waive their 
rights as a condition of publication,38 a plausible scenario given the disparity in 
bargaining power that traditionally has existed between authors and publishers. 
.   The United States, now a powerful player in the international intellectual 
property environment, continues to resist the introduction of moral rights into its 
copyright legislation.  Brian E. Koeberle describes how the American Congress was 
persuaded in the late 1980’s that American law generally already provided sufficient 
protection for moral rights and thus the United States needed to make no explicit changes 
to its copyright legislation in order to comply with the moral rights provisions of the 
Berne Convention once the United States became signatory to it in 1989 (Koeberle, 
1989).  On the contrary, many believe that American law does not provide moral rights 
protection sufficient to satisfy the Berne Convention (Damich, 1988, Grant, 1992, 
Ginsburg 2001), despite the subsequent passage of the limited Visual Artists’ Rights Act 
(1990).  And, again, it must be recalled that it was through the express influence of the 
United States that the moral rights obligations of the Berne Convention were not 
incorporated into the TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights), which is appended to the World Trade Organization Agreement of 
1994 and incorporates the Berne Convention (art. 9(1)) except for the one section of the 
Berne Convention, Article 6bis, which provides for moral rights of the author. 
 
.   
The omission of moral rights from TRIPS has been thought to place moral rights 
protection on an ambiguous footing (Rajan, 2002, p.190). On the other hand, two earlier  
                                                 
38 See David Vaver (1987). 
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major public law instruments refer to “moral ... interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production”: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 
27(2)) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 
15(1) (c)). And the recent WIPO Treaty on Performances and Phonograms (1996), which 
came into force March 2002, requires rights of attribution and integrity for performers 
(Article 5).  
 
(e) Is there a substitute for moral rights? 
The lack of enthusiasm which the United States has shown for the moral rights 
regime may be partially explained by the emphasis that the United States places upon the 
commercial exploitation of information.  In this context, it will be recalled from earlier 
discussion, the traditional print publishing industry by the twentieth century had, in many 
jurisdictions, created an imprimatur of quality through the identities of the major 
publishing houses.  As media empires have grown, particularly in the United States, it 
may be suggested that that function has been assumed by the trademarks of the major 
entertainment conglomerates.  Trademark, in the commercial sphere, functions as the 
quintessential indicator of the public’s sense of source.  In a society which reveres 
trademark and where important information sources are identified in the minds of the 
public with particular trademarks, there may be less impulse for a strong system of moral 
rights to be developed to respond to information needs. Of course, such a system would 
require that those commercial conglomerates maintain control over very significant 
proportions of the information transfers in society.  This possibility may have motivated 
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the following rather pessimistic comment, made by American Adam Moore, after 
reviewing the moral rights regime:  
Arguably the creator’s rights tradition has played [a] minor role 
in the formulation and application of Anglo-American systems of 
intellectual property.  Even in those countries where these rights 
are codified in the law, they are apt to be overshadowed by the 
aforementioned economic rights and incentive based social 
progress arguments. … The globalization of intellectual property, 
rapid growth of digital networks, and expanding power of 
multinational corporations, have pushed systems of intellectual 
property away from theoretical foundations and back toward 
privilege (2004, p. 204). 
Of course, as argued herein, it may be in the pragmatic, economic interests of 
societies, now, to limit the privilege of elites created by the technology of the industrial 
revolution precisely through the strengthening of the moral rights regime in order to 
assist the public in identifying reliable and relevant information for their needs.  Such a 
move would foster the social and economic conditions necessary for efficient and 
effective information transfer, which appears to be prerequisite to success in the new age 
of communications.   
In a more distributed information environment, perhaps such as the internet is 
providing, and as trademarks come to represent increasingly diverse portfolios of goods 
and services, trademark law may no longer adequately serve this information need in 
society to evaluate the authoritativeness of information sources. Indeed, the American 
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Supreme Court made precisely this finding in 2003 when it was held that the American 
Lanham Act, governing trademark, could not be used to enforce a claim which was 
essentially a moral rights claim for paternity (Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp. et al).  The decision held that s.43(a) of the Lanham Act governing 
trademarks could not be invoked to prohibit copying a work such as a television series (as 
was at issue in the case) without crediting original creators nor could it be invoked to 
prohibit misattribution.  This leaves the United States beleaguered and creators 
unprotected from a moral rights perspective, even in industries where trademark itself is 
prevalent and strong (Landau, 2005).   
The United States has had a longer experience than many countries with a limited 
system of economic rights in copyright:  a system which focussed on registration and 
which had a relatively short period of protection.39  Because of the limited nature of 
American copyright, there came to be a vibrant sense of the public domain, conceived of 
as an extensive environment in which information transfer was unhampered by the claims 
of copyright.40  For countries like Canada, who have long been members of the Berne 
Convention, that experience was long ago replaced by one in which the existence of 
economic rights in works was the norm:  copyright arising upon creation of the work and 
lasting for the author’s lifetime plus a further fifty years.  The “public domain” was 
interpreted less as a construct without copyright claims and more as a construct of uses of 
copyrighted works that lay outside the purview of the copyright holder’s control (see 
                                                 
39 The situation in the United States until the reforms of the 1970’s began, culminating in Berne 
membership in 1989.  Joining the Berne Convention meant abandoning the system of copyright upon 
registration since Berne requires copyright upon creation of the work.  It also meant adopting a period of 
protection of at least the life of the author plus 50 years, whereas the United States previously had a period 
of protection of 28 years with a possible 28 years renewal. 
40 As a consequence, many Americans, including librarians, argue that recent copyright legislation in the 
United States extends copyright far beyond what is necessary to enhance the supply of information to 
satisfy users’ information needs; see, for example, Chalsty (1999) and Cheverie (2002). 
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Wilkinson, 2003-4).  In such an environment, which is now the environment shared by 
the United States after the extremely rapid changes of the past two decades, it is just as 
well to have a player independent of the holders of the economic interests in copyright 
who can advance no less worthy claims in certain circumstances (the author’s claims to 
moral rights) and limit the control of the economic rights holders in the information 
environment. 
For England and Wales, where statutory moral rights protection is greater than in 
the United States but much more limited than in Canada, Jonathan Griffiths (2006) has 
explored the continued availability of the common law of the unregistered trade mark as 
an alternative to statutory moral rights.  We argue that, even where trademark remedies 
may be available, the more appropriate approach in the long term is for countries to focus 
on their moral rights regimes in the context of the development of copyright.  First, it is 
unlikely, given the precedent of the past, that those who form the elite in the present 
economy will continue to form the elite as the new information economy emerges fully 
and law designed to perpetuate the old elites will not ultimately assist nations in the 
emergence of the new economy.  Second, again as demonstrated through the abortive 
attempts at law that preceded the creation of the economic rights in copyright, law 
focussed on a model of information flow from the past will ultimately prove ineffective 
in controlling information transfers in the future. 
 
4.  Conclusion  
As information technology continues to re-shape the future, the distributed, digital 
environment, where every author is also potentially a publisher and every user is possibly 
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also either an author or a publisher (or both),41 is challenging the oldest copyright 
controls, the economic rights.  The future may lie precisely in the strengthening of the 
moral rights regime in order to assist the public in identifying reliable and relevant 
information for their needs. Such law will foster the economic and social conditions 
necessary for efficient and effective information transfer.  The public interest in moral 
rights demands not only that moral rights provisions be adopted in law but that these 
rights should also be expanded.  
With the increased possibilities for manipulation of recordings as society 
experiences digitization, it may be that there is good reason to extend moral rights 
protection to sound recordings.42  Moreover, if digitization puts the authenticity of 
performers’ performances at risk, then it would also seem to be socially desirable to 
attach moral rights to this area of subject matter as well.43  
 The period of protection for moral rights varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction at 
present and needs to be addressed.44 Analysis of the social and economic importance of 
moral rights would lead to the conclusion that moral rights should attach to works for as 
long as their provenance and authority is an issue for those seeking to make use of the 
underlying works. 
                                                 
41 As Rajan (2004) notes, “[i]n effect, through technology, in combination with cultural training and values, 
the audience, too, has become an ‘author’.” (p.53). 
42 See Bill C-61 of 2008, s.8, intending to add s.17.1 to the current Canadian Copyright Act. 
43 It is more difficult to discern, on its face, any argument based on this analysis that would favour 
extension of moral rights to broadcasts, broadcasting being an area which has been argued above to involve 
extensions of channel control rather than ordinary copyright control. 
 
44 It may be recalled that the Berne Convention leaves the span of protection undefined beyond a minimum 
expectation that these rights last the lifetime of the author.  As mentioned above, this minimum is the 
period of protection in the American Visual Artists’ Rights Act; Canada’s period of protection is the life of 
the author plus fifty years, to match the period of protection of the economic rights in Canada; in France 
moral rights are protected in perpetuity. 
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The perspective presented here is that moral rights and economic rights in 
copyright are best understood as the implementation of information policy designed to 
further the interests of society in an expanding supply of reliable, available information.  
The economic rights are designed to address the question of the supply of available 
information, while moral rights are designed to address the question of making the 
reliability of that supply ascertainable. The need to assist information users to make these 
judgements is becoming more urgent in the emerging environment.  As Clifford A. 
Lynch points out: 
Highly distributed information dissemination systems like the World 
Wide Web herald a fundamental change …Among the consequences of 
this shift will be a new emphasis on the provenance of data and 
metadata, and the need for information retrieval systems to permit users 
to factor in trust preferences about this information (Lynch, 2001, p. 
12). 
With the growing complexity of the information environment, moral rights will become 
increasingly important as a guarantee for the authority and the integrity of the work.  
Moral rights regimes, enshrining at least the author’s rights to integrity and paternity, 
should be embraced and enhanced for this very reason.   
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